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SPECIAL THEME:
REFLECTIONS ON 20TH CENTURY PHILOSOPHY IN MEXICO
SOME LESSONS OF A CHRONOLOGY OF 20TH CENTURY
PHILOSOPHY IN MEXICO
CARLOS PEREDA

ABSTRACT: The paper begins by criticizing the usual division of Latin America philosophy

into three stages: founders, forgers and thecnicians. Then the history of philosophy in 20th in
Mexico is narrated with the help of four maps that indicates the main positions and names.
Towards the end, two kinds of lessons are drawn. The first is to promote the destruction of the
vices of such a philosophy to regain its virtues. The second lesson comes from interpreting the
metaphors of the previous maps: we are victims of shipwreckes living in archipielagos and thus
we may explore their transitions.
Keywords: chronology, figures, history, lessons, Mexican philosophy, movements, virtues and
vices

As an auxiliary to history, each chronology structures a certain time, gives some order
to events, and gives food for thought. In what way? When a chronology presents ideas
of a time lapse, that chronology usually invites us to investigate it in more detail; for
example, to elucidate one of the movements or figures of that time. But research can
become more ambitious and aim to compare chronologies and point out continuities
and ruptures, with developments of ideas in similar times in other places. However,
these historical, or historiographical lessons are not the only type of lessons that a
chronology can offer. That is why, although the main goal of this paper is to
introduce—just to introduce, very briefly—a chronology of Mexican philosophy in the
20th century by way of enumerating its main movements and figures (section II in this
paper) in a small complementary discussion, I will suggest some other lessons to draw
from these developments. This second type of lessons can be generated from questions
that provoke discussions such as the following: Why have philosophical discussions
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shifted from having an interest in certain topics to others? What internal and external
factors led to those changes? What are the epistemic and practical virtues and vices that
generated the changes, or are these virtues and vices a byproduct of those changes?
What can we learn for our own research in the present times about those past
discussions and their changes? (sections 3 and 4). However, before these reflections at
the very beginning of the paper, I will make some general observations (section 1)
1
Telling a story about philosophical thought is not an innocent task: it at least involves
evaluating those thoughts and organizing them with justification. If these tasks are
carried out from what we might call “nomadic thought”—a way of thinking freely that
does not adhere to received distinctions and that risks crossing unknown territories—
then any typology or chronology becomes disputable. At most, we should think of these
as proposals to be taken up in discussion. Such thinking relies on various procedures.
One of them is the “strategy of detours,” or horizontal nomadism, wherein many side
paths are taken in order to locate a problem in relation to other problems of the past or
present. So, before offering this short history of philosophy in Mexico, I want to take
two preparatory detours.
First preparatory detour: Mexican philosophy, and Latin American philosophy in
general, are sometimes reconstructed teleologically across three stages, which together
are supposed to display an ascending character, or to constitute signs of progress (Miró
Quesada 1974). These stages are: the stage of the founders, that of the forgers, and that
of the technicians. However, so that we can dismiss this false teleology, I think it would
be advisable, among many other corrections, to replace the word “founders” with the
rather ugly word “forgetters.” This is because the word “founders” seems to overlook—
or rather to obliterate—the very rich philosophical past of New Spain in many Latin
American countries like Mexico. In a similar fashion, efforts have been made, even
presently, to disregard the significance of nineteenth-century liberal republicanism in
these countries; but surely these movements contain more interesting philosophical
ideas than is usually assumed. Moreover, and quite unsurprisingly, the vast, varied, and
extremely rich body of indigenous thought is routinely despised in these histories of
Mexican philosophy.
Also, the meaning of the word “forgers” is not very clear. Leaving aside the usual
sense of the term in English—a “forger” is typically a “falsifier”—the word “forger” is
sometimes meant to refer to someone who creates something with a great deal of work
and effort. Thus, “to forge” is sometimes used almost interchangeably with the verbs
“to build,” “to devise,” “to imagine,” “to invent,” or “to project”. In the history of
philosophy, thinkers like Plato, Augustine, or Hume are fittingly called “forgers”: those
who “forge”—imagine, construct, invent—arguments and theories that, from different
perspectives and with profound originality, illuminate realities. If to those venerable
names we looked for their equivalents in Mexican philosophy, specifically among
writers in Spanish, we should immediately include Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, José
Vasconcelos, and Rosario Castellanos, among others. But one might immediately
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object: some of these Mexican figures expressed themselves mainly in poems or in
essays. But, by the same token, would we thereby consider Plato (who wrote
dialogues), Augustine (the author of confessions), and Hume (an essayist), minor
thinkers? Starting with irreverent or perhaps silly questions like these allows us to
understand that this three-stage teleology of Latin American philosophy has been built
to exalt the third stage. It’s as though one can hear the following veiled remark: “At
last there are people in these second-rate, desolate lands who read the latest papers
published in academic journals. Finally, and fortunately, these folks no longer think for
themselves, but now, with discipline, limit themselves to commenting on and discreetly
introducing questions or, perhaps, minor doubts—if they are bold enough—regarding
whatever might be discussed in the Headquarters of Thought.” For this reason, the stage
of the “technical philosophers”—the third, and supposedly most glorious level in this
teleology—is perhaps better understood as occupied by people completely dominated
by the vices of subaltern fervor and craving for novelties.
I said that I was going to introduce two preparatory detours. My second detour aims
to tell this short history of philosophical thought in Mexico as a succession of maps.
With. maps we usually organize space for the purpose of providing guidance. Thus,
maps are drawn on different scales depending on our needs. An undetailed map might
help us if what we need is a very general sense of direction. But if we want to find a
precise place, we need very specific maps. At the same time, in a manner similar to
how maps of spaces are constructed—and this is my conjecture—we can also use
nomadic thinking in order to draw maps of times and histories. These successive maps
allow us to articulate yet another procedure of nomadic thinking, namely the “strategy
of transitions,” or vertical nomadism, which serves to shift the level of abstraction with
which we attend to a problem.
Of course, in the following four maps we won’t find a teleology, but rather different
thinkers who are preponderantly founders, or preponderantly forgers, or
preponderantly technical thinkers, or who, throughout their lives, have moved from one
role to another. But, just in their characters as maps, the first two can be considered
preparations for the third map and its successive submaps. The fourth map should be
seen as a coda that projects into the 21st century and that will need to be analyzed and
evaluated in the years to come. Unfortunately, with these maps I will be merely listing
some positions and names. A first approximation, then.
2
As I have already insinuated, the following four maps—which I offer as ways of
rethinking the history of philosophy in Mexico in the 20th century—are close to
caricatures:
Map 1. The generation of those who strove to restart a fresh culture that emerged
in Mexico around 1910 as a challenge to the “official ideas” current during the
Dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz (1876-1911). This effort was sponsored academically by
Antonio Caso (1883–1946) and further promoted in public life by José Vasconcelos
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(1882–1959).1 Although they were both trained in positivism, they reacted strongly
against it in their youth. Among other aspects, this renewal in philosophy was launched
with a call to disengage from yet another colonial vice, namely nationalist
enthusiasms, 2 and thus with a call to listen willingly to the voices of universal
philosophy without paying much attention to local currents of thought (Spanish neoscholasticism, French-style positivism in the manner of Comte, the remains of
nineteenth-century liberalism). However, we also find in Caso and in Vasconcelos a
deep and persistent concern for the particularities of the Mexican situation, albeit a
concern that did not always succumb to the vice of nationalist enthusiasms. At the same
time they displayed a strong interest in metaphysics and aesthetics. (Vasconcelos
produced a systematic metaphysics, “aesthetic monism.”) Additionally, both thinkers
displayed confidence in education as an instrument of social progress. In particular,
Vasconcelos’s project was to rebuild mestizo culture as the basis for Mexican identity
and to promote the study of the country's natural and cultural history. Thus, the
concepts of the “cosmic race” (“raza cósmica”; cf Miller 2004) and of “indianology”
(“indialogía”) played a central role in this reconstruction.
We should also mention Samuel Ramos (1897–1959) as this generation’s third
member. Caso was Ramos’s teacher as well as the one who led him to take an interest
in aesthetics. However, the extremely negative criticisms that Ramos leveled against
the psychology of the Mexican people and the culture in Mexico were incompatible
with the reflections of Caso and Vasconcelos.3 (This fact has led many to question
whether Ramos really fits within this first map.)
Map 2. The “Spanish Exiles.” Following the defeat of the Second Spanish Republic
and the establishment of Francisco Franco's dictatorship, a contingent of philosophers
arrived in Mexico. These newcomers did not experience exile 4 as the situation of
banished people or as “desterrados;” they instead experienced it as those who had
changed their country but not their cultures or traditions, and who continued enriching
those cultures and traditions by looking to new horizons—as “trasterrados,” to use José
Gaos’s expression. Gaos (1900–1969) was the most influential thinker in this group for
his teaching, for his work in phenomenology and existentialism, and for his immense

1

Translations of important excerpts by both thinkers are included in Gracia (1986). By Antonio Caso
are included excerpts from The Human Person and the Totalitarian State (1941) as well as excerpts from
his main book Existence as Economy, Disinterest, and Charity (Obras completas, 1972). By José
Vasconcelos are included excerpts from Todología and from Philosophy Manual (Obras completas,
1961). There are also other important translations of texts by Caso and Vasconcelos in Sánchez and
Sanchez, Jr. (2017).
2
For a characterization of these three vices—subaltern fervor, craving for novelty, nationalist
enthusiasms—see Pereda (2006: 192–203), and Pereda (2013).
3
Ramos’s (1962) main book on the collective psychology of Mexican society was originally written in
1934.
4
Throughout the 20th century, exile was a frequent experience for many Spanish and Latin American
writers and philosophers. Cf. Pereda 2019.
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and generous interest in the past of Mexican thought.5 The brief stay in Mexico of
María Zambrano (1904–1991) also left traces of poetic thinking that were diffuse but
deep. In addition, the works and teaching of José María Gallegos Rocafull (1895-1963)
and of Eduardo Nicol (1907–1990) were of some importance.
Map 3. The “Era of the big blocs.” These blocs were formed directly or indirectly
from the teachings of the Spanish exiles. (Of course, these teachings also promoted,
among many good things, a few colonial vices.) Appealing now to more specific maps,
I refer to the following “big blocs”:
The “Mexicanism” of the Hyperion group, with thinkers such as Jorge Portilla (1919–
1963) and Emilio Uranga (1921–1988).6 We might also mention, apart from this group, the
historiographical work of Carmen Rovira (1923-).
“Latin Americanism.” The best-known philosopher with more enduring work in this field
was Leopoldo Zea (1912–2004). According to Zea, there are reciprocal relationships
between historical facts and ideas. Zea defended the idea of a united Latin America, and—
with no less force—the idea that the discovery of 1492 in fact gave way to a concealment
of cultures and knowledge.7 This bloc might also include the comprehensive theories—
indebted to liberation theology and Marx—of Enrique Dussel (1934-), the most influential
representative of the Latin American philosophy of liberation.8
Marxism, whose most decisive philosophical figure was Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez (1915–
2011), with his reasoned and energetic proposal for a philosophy of praxis. But it is also
important to mention Bolívar Echevarría (1941–2010), with his revaluation of the baroque
ethos as a way of thinking about Latin America and his attack on the “metaphysics of
whiteness” as the generator of modernity. Nor should we overlook fragments of the work
of Carlos Pereyra (1940–1988), especially those indebted to Althusserian Marxism and his
pages bearing witness to a progressive critical departure from such a perspective.
-The analytic tradition. With his contributions to deontic logic, Eduardo García Máynez
(1908-1993) in the 1950s introduced analytic philosophy to Mexico. Soon afterwards, Luis
Villoro (1922-2014), Fernando Salmerón (1925-1997), and Alejandro Rossi (19322009)—based on their severe criticism of the phenomenological training imparted by their
teacher Gaos—hailed the importance of studying and practicing analytic philosophy, with
the purpose of “professionalizing” and “normalizing” philosophy in Mexico. According to
their proposal, philosophy should no longer be a form of “personal confession”—as Gaos
once characterized it—or a set of social and political proclamations, but rather a rigorous
body of research like the other sciences. (It should be noted that, regarding Luis Villoro,
his work in analytic philosophy was just one of many stages in his vast and illuminating
5

In Sánchez and Sánches, Jr (2017) we find translations of Gaos’s “Two Ideas of Philosophy” and “My
Two Cents: ‘American’ Philosophy?’”.
6
Both thinkers have recently been of some interest, having been translated and received commentaries
in English. On Portilla, cf. Sánchez (2012), and Gallegos and Sánchez (2020). On Uranga, cf. Sánchez
(2021).
7
Some of Zea’s works in English were published in 1963, 1959a, and 1959b; in Sánchez and Sánchez,
Jr (2017) we find from Zea, “Philosophy as Commitment” (1952).
8
Cf. Dussel 2008, 2011, and 2013.
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trajectory. 9 Indeed, his work began with a more or less paternalistic interest in the
indigenous problem.10 However, throughout his life this interest was transformed, on the
one hand, into the ability to listen to the needs and projects of indigenous people and, on
the other hand, into contributions to policies meant to promote their well-being.11)
The metaphysical tradition. In contrast with the other factions, in this case we have a
“negative bloc”—which might also be referred to as the bloc of “the heterodox.” Its
members have little or nothing in common with each other, beyond their resistance to
belonging to other blocs. The figures worth mentioning here are Antonio Gómez Robledo
(1908–1994), certain fragments of Uranga's thought, Ramón Xirau (1924–2017), as well
as Juliana González (1936-). One might also place in this group Mauricio Beuchot (1950-),
who, belonging to a younger generation, has nevertheless attracted attention with his theory
of analogical hermeneutics.
Feminism. If we are to reconstruct the beginnings of feminism in twentieth-century
Mexico—and nothing more than its beginnings—we must not overlook the theoretical
contributions made in essays by the great writer Rosario Castellanos (1925–1974),12 nor
overlook the pioneering academic work by Graciela Hierro (1928–2003).

Map 4. The “irruption of the Archipelago.” Starting in the late 1980s with the fall
of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, Marxism lost much
of the interest it had garnered in Mexico and as well as some of its public appeal in the
Western world. It must be remembered that in Mexico—as well as in many regions of
Latin America—the cause which provoked the most widespread versions of Marxism
was the vice of subaltern fervor, as in the maddened desire to multiply the franchises
of Louis Althusser and his disciples in our universities and colleges. Moreover, a strong
criticism of Marxism had emerged in Paris by that time, including attacks that amount
to silly misunderstandings of Marx. (It is well known: you never fight more harshly
and unfairly than against beliefs you used to embrace passionately, and that today are
no less recklessly considered old-fashioned.) On the other hand, it should be kept in
mind that academic Marxism in Mexico was not just another bloc: it was the
“provocative bloc.” Thus, when it fell apart, its militant resistance lost its meaning as a
binding force. Hence the metaphor of the archipelago. But the image of a shipwreck is
also appropriate. Indeed, the latter is a metaphor much appreciated by Guillermo
Hurtado (2016), though he does not simply refer to a shipwreck but rather to a “dialectic
of a shipwreck”: that is, to a situation in which, if we know how to take advantage of
it, allows the shipwrecked people—or archipelago dwellers—that we have become to

9

A book belonging to this period is Villoro 1998.
Cf. Luis Villoro, The Major Moments of Indigenism in Mexico: Conclusion, in Sánchez and Sánchez,
Jr (2017).
11
On this later period in Villoro’s thinking, it is useful to take into account Pappas (2017).
12
Cf. Rosario Castellanos, On Feminine Culture, excerpted in Sánchez and Sánchez Jr (2017).
10
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risk entering into a “dialogue as an adventure”13 and, in this way, to be able to combat
those colonial vices afflicting us.
3
In this very short and disputable account of twentieth-century Mexican philosophical
thought, the presence of colonial vices, namely subaltern fervor and craving for
novelty—as well as their opposite, compensating, and equally dangerous vice, namely
nationalist enthusiasms—have popped up everywhere. However, I am more interested
here in reconstructing the lessons of a nomadic thought: one that teaches us that
destroying these vices would allow us to rescue certain virtues, which can in turn aid
us in continuing to think. Clearly, every vice is a deformed virtue, owing to some lack
or excess. Now, I think that if the above-mentioned vices are destroyed, we can extract
valuable materials.
For example, subaltern fervor and craving for novelty are passive attitudes. Those
who fall prey to these vices try to empty their minds in order to administer in their
localities only what is discussed in the Headquarters of Thought, or whatever happens
to be the academic fashion of the moment. The motto of these people could be: “Let's
not dirty our thoughts with anything in a personal tone.” Fortunately, this passivity is
frequently left aside in Mexico, and there is presently in Mexico a kind of recovery of
attention to personal needs and personal capacity for judgment. Thus, these vices can
be transformed into virtues, specifically into such virtues as openness, the drive to
address new problems, or the drive to try to address problems in various ways. In
contrast, the vice of nationalist enthusiasms develops into attitudes that, in defending
one’s own identity, are not only active but in fact hostile. All thought becomes not only
a closely personal affair but also a closely group affair. Consequently, the opposition
between “us” and “them” is the spur to all cognitive activity. People then become
unable to think that, in order to be dealt with properly, some issues require an
impersonal point of view. But once this incapacity is overcome, this vice also becomes
a virtue: by reaffirming our own identity, we become willing to engage in dialogue with
other identities, to enrich ourselves with their points of view.
We can also extract valuable lessons from those efforts typified by the maps
picturing stages of Mexican philosophy in the 20th century. For, without a doubt,
metaphors invite us to continue thinking, and sometimes even force us to explore
unexpected thoughts. For example, Caso’s and Vasconcelos’s efforts to restart a new
culture in Mexico exhibit features of deep and rigorous thinking. Furthermore, a way
of thinking that takes itself seriously cannot fail to make a temporary “clean slate” of
previous theories. Consequently, it is important from time to time to reexamine our
problems as if no one had examined them before: to think from the very beginning. Of
course, such a liberating gesture can also be seen as nothing more than an attitude of
methodological hygiene as well as an act by which we might recover our strength and
13

Hurtado (2016: 107) not only discusses such a kind of dialogue but also “an archaeology of hope,”.
Elsewhere (Hurtado 2011) he qualifies his diagnosis.
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drive. Because no one is ever actually at the beginning. We are rather always in the
middle of something.
No less important was the effort carried out by refugees from the Second Spanish
Republic. Real philosophy is often generated in coexistence with strange thoughts and
with people from other lands, often exiles who desperately flee from countries that have
become unlivable. But we do not simply inherit these situations. The difficulty lies in
knowing how to distinguish—again, something very slippery—between the virtue of
appropriating new horizons and the vice of subaltern fervor. However, it is important
to insist that we bear many such inheritances: some from friendly outsiders, others from
distant foreigners and even from those who, at least at first glance, would appear to be
unpleasant or hostile—if not enemy—aliens. Thus, let us not be confused: the attitude
of openness is a way of continuing to think for oneself, while recognizing that
inevitably one thinks in the middle of something.
On the other hand, the establishment of large and conflicting blocs of thought
frequently awakens dogmatic dreams and, thus, spurs both cooperative and noncooperative debates. Consequently, we must make an effort towards arguing in a
renewed way and in various directions; towards answering reasons to the contrary, and
towards questioning deep-rooted beliefs and interests. In this way an opportunity arises
for examining others’ positions as well as our own: because—let us never forget—we
always think in the middle of something.
Finally, let's return to the metaphor of the archipelago. The sea not only separates
those islands composing an archipelago—in this case, the various participants in
philosophy in Mexico; it also relates those islands to each other in a fluid way. This
observation leads us to recall one of the aims making up the background for any
reflection: the aim of integrating—that is, the practice opposed to exclusion—since it
is through nomadic thinking that we know ourselves to be in the middle of something.
4
It is still worth emphasizing that practices of restarting and of appropriating new
horizons are forms of nomadic thought in which we interrupt distinctions, concepts,
arguments, and debates, as well as those different forms of consensus that we should
never accept simply because they are generally taken for granted. Therefore,
questioning each of these opens up possibilities for thinking and acting along
overlooked or unimagined paths. Additionally, practices of argument and of connecting
ideas help us to introduce and to consolidate our need for recognizing and
acknowledging ourselves in an interactive ecology. Therefore, practices of nomadic
thinking operate as decisive therapies so that we can continue to think more creatively.
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